Human capital accumulation may negatively a¤ect economic growth by increasing tax avoidance and reducing e¤ective tax rates and productive public investment. This paper analyzes how the endogenous feedback between human capital accumulation and tax avoidance a¤ects economic growth and macroeconomic dynamics. Our …ndings show that this interaction produces remarkable growth and welfare e¤ects.
Introduction
Tax evasion and tax avoidance phenomena are present in all economies. 1 Although both imply reducing the taxpayers' tax bill, tax evasion is an illegal activity, while the behaviour of tax avoidance is legal. Tax avoidance includes not only the use of strategies that allow for the legal minimization of taxes (for instance to increase the pension savings to use the tax relief), but also for the search of strategies to exploit de…ciencies or ambiguities in the law (known as aggressive tax planning strategies). For this reason, sometimes the line that separates both phenomena is a very …ne one, and the economic literature usually denotes both terms jointly as tax "non-compliance".
However,it is important to analyze both avoidance and evasion separately, not only for the legal and moral issues, but more so for economic reasons. Since the returns of tax evasion and tax avoidance are of a di¤erent nature, they must be introduced in an economic model in a di¤erent way. The return from tax evasion is contingent, because it is subject to possible auditing. However, the return from tax avoidance is riskless since there is no chance of its being penalised. The fact that one is contingent and the other is not in itself constitutes a great di¤erence between them. Furthermore, the e¤ects that some variables (for instance, education) have on both behaviours could even be opposite.
The e¤ect of human capital on tax avoidance is clear. Avoiding taxes requires some skills that are achieved at a certain level of educational. Thus, the reported results for the relationship between the taxpayer's educational level and the avoidance and aggressive tax planning behaviour are doubtless. Auerbach et al (2002) tested that tax avoidance increases over time because taxpayers have learned successful techniques to shelter gains from taxes. Fox and Luna (2005) …nd that the number of limited liability companies relates positively to the percentage of the population with bachelor degrees. Murphy (2006) …nds that the taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning are considerably more educated than taxpayers from the general population. 2 However, when tax evasion behaviour is analyzed the obtained results are not always conclusive. Some papers …nd that more education reduces the preference to cheat [see Kinsey and Grasmick (1993) and Hite (1997) ]. However, others have found mixed results. That is, education could either increase or reduce tax evasion [see Jackson and Milliron (1986) ]. Therefore, with this empirical evidence, to introduce the role of human capital in analyzing how non-compliance a¤ects economic growth we should explicitly separate tax avoidance from tax evasion. As far as we know, no previous paper analyzes the e¤ect of tax avoidance on economic growth. In fact, only a few papers have analyzed the role that non compliance tax plays on economic growth. The main conclusion obtained by the literature is that the relation between tax evasion and economic growth 1 In US, for the period 1976-1992, the nominal tax gap, generated by non-compliance, increases from $ 22.7 billion to $95.3 billion [see Adreoni et al. (1998) ]. In New Zealand, Giles (1999) estimated that over the period 1968-94, the total tax gap was in the order of 6.4% to 10.2% of total tax liability. More recent estimations for the shadow economy are in Scheneider (2005), although a signi…cant proportion of income is unreported for reasons other than taxation.
2 One can also consider that higher your income is, the higher are your possibilities to pay someone to tell you how to avoid taxes. This issue does not invalidate our statement when education is positively related to income. is ambiguous, and depends mainly on the degree of productivity of public goods. 3 Computing the actual dimension of tax avoidance is di¢ cult, but some papers have highlighted its relevance. Thus, Oxfam (2000) has computed that the cost of corporate tax avoidance in developing countries is around $50 billion annually. Murphy (2002) also shows that during the 1990s, an estimated $4 billion in tax revenue was lost as a result of 42,000 Australians becoming involved in aggressive mass market tax schemes. Moreover, Braithwaite (2003) relates that a multitude of strategies that seek to exploit de…ciencies in the law are continuously being devised each year. Therefore, tax avoidance is an important issue that deserves to be considered. This paper analyzes how tax avoidance a¤ects to economic growth, by introducing the role of human capital accumulation. It is well known that human capital accumulation is an important source of economic growth because it increases the e¢ ciency units of labour. However, there is also other mechanism through which human capital may reduce economic growth. Our hypothesis is that the causality between tax avoidance and human capital accumulation goes in both directions. Tax avoidance signi…cantly reduces government revenues and therefore a¤ects the level of public expenditure. In an economy where human capital accumulation depends on public expenditure, it is clear that tax avoidance can also a¤ect this process.
The aim of this paper is to analyze how the endogenous feedback between human capital accumulation and tax avoidance a¤ects economic growth and macroeconomic dynamics. To do this, we introduce endogenous tax avoidance in an endogenous economic growth model with human and public capital accumulation. The analysis will show that the interaction between human capital accumulation and tax avoidance may produce remarkable growth and welfare e¤ects. Moreover, it will show how these two e¤ects have in general opposite sign. Avoidance can either increase or reduce economic growth depending on both the value of the legal tax rate and the intensity of the tax avoidance technology.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic model. Section 3 de…nes the balanced growth equilibrium of the economy. Section 4 numerically characterizes how human capital accumulation, …scal policy and avoidance a¤ect growth and welfare. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and discusses the main …ndings of the analysis, and prospects future research.
The economy
We consider an in…nite horizon, continuous time, endogenous growth model with accumulation of private and public capital. In particular, we extend the one-sector growth model with productive public investment introduced by Barro (1990) . We introduce two main modi…cations. First, instead of considering public expenditure we consider public capital. as do Futagami et al. (1993) . Second, we assume the e¤ective tax rate as being endogenous due to tax avoidance.
Our economy consists of competitive …rms, a representative household and the government. We assume that the unique good of this economy is produce by means of a production function that uses private and public capital as inputs. We consider a broad de…nition of private capital to include physical and human capital. For simplicity in the exposition, from now on we will refer to human capital to denote this broad stock of capital. We consider a Cobb-Douglas production function, so that output is given by
with 2 (0; 1) and where A is the constant total factor productivity; h t is the per capita stock of human capital; and g t is the per capita stock of public capital. Observe that the production function exhibits private diminishing returns to human capital, and social constant returns to scale. This implies that the competitive …rms operate with strictly positive pro…ts. 4 Pro…t maximization implies that the rental price of human capital equals its marginal productivity:
and pro…ts are given by
Output y t can either be used for consumption c t , producing new human capital or public investment I t . Hence, the stock of human capital evolves as
where 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of human capital stock. The household preferences are represented by the discounted lifetime utility:
where > 0 is the constant subjective rate of time preference, and > 0 denotes the inverse of the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Household is endowed with private capital that inelastically supplies to …rms. She allocates her after-tax income to consumption and investment in human capital. Accordingly, the consumer's budget constraint is given by
where 2 (0; 1) is the nominal tax rate on total income, and t (h t ; y t ) 2 (0; 1) is the rate of tax avoidance. Given a tax rate set by the government, the household faces to an e¤ective tax rate given by (1 t ) : We assume that the ability to avoid taxes is an increasing and concave function 0 > 0 and 00 < 0: For a given level of human capital, economic development makes avoidance more complicated. This modelling assumption eliminates the e¤ects of sustained growth on tax avoidance. If tax avoidance were not be only a function of human capital-output ratio, then the level of avoidance would explode as the stock of human capital tends to in…nity. In other words, this assumption is needed to ensure the existence of a balanced growth path along which output grows at a constant rate. We will consider the following functional form for the rate of tax avoidance:
with a 2 (0; 1) measures the intensity of tax avoidance or, equivalently, the productivity of human capital in avoiding taxes. Finally, observe that tax avoidance is a non rival activity, i.e., household immediately reduces the e¤ective tax rate when she acquires new human capital. 5 The objective of the household is to maximize the utility function (2.5) subject to (2.6) and (2.7). From the …rst-order conditions of this maximization problem, we obtain that the household's optimal plan is given by:
together with the budget constraint (2.6), the avoidance rate (2.7) and the usual transversality condition lim
Equation (2.8) is the Euler equation that determines the intertemporal allocation of consumption and investment, i.e., the growth rate of consumption. As usual, this condition equates the return from investing one unit of output y t and the growth of the marginal utility arising from consuming one additional unit of this good. Due to endogenous avoidance, in our economy the marginal return from investing in human capital has two components. The …rst component, R 1;t ; is the market return given by the e¤ective after-tax wage rate:
The second component, R 2;t :
comes from the fact that the investment in human capital also increases tax avoidance. In consequence, the e¤ective tax rate diminishes and the disposable income increases. The government in this economy only provides productive public capital to …rms. This government …nances public investment I t by means of a ‡at-tax income. We assume that this public intervention is subject to a balanced budget. Tax revenues depends on the nominal tax rate and on the rate of avoidance t : Hence, public investment is given by
Finally, the law of motion for public capital is
where 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of public capital.
Competitive equilibrium
Given the initial stocks of human capital h 0 and public capital g 0 ; a competitive equilibrium under a …scal policy is de…ned as the time path of prices fw t g and quantities fc t ; k t ; g t ; t g that satis…es: (i) the utility maximization conditions (2.8), (2.6), (2.7) and (2.9); (ii) the pro…t maximization conditions (2.2) and (2.3); and (iii) the government constraints (2.12) and (2.13). After manipulating these equilibrium conditions we obtain the growth rate of human capital
and of consumption
Our economy exhibits a balanced growth path (BGP, henceforth) equilibrium, along which the stock of human capital, consumption and the stock of public capital grow at a constant and equal rate denoted by , whereas the rental rate of human capital and the output-human capital ratio remain constant.
As is standard procedure, to proceed with the analysis, we consider the aggregate ratios z t = ht gt and x t = ct ht ; which will be constant along a BGP. Combining (3.1) and (3.2), we get
and combining (3.1) and (3.3) we obtain
The dynamic equilibrium is thus fully characterized by a set of paths fz t ; x t g such that, given the initial value z 0 of human to public capital ratio, solves the system of equations (3.4) and (3.5), and satis…es the transversality condition (2.9). Observe that in this characterization of the equilibrium paths z t is the unique state variable and x t is the control variable.
Numerical analysis
It is not possible to analytically prove the existence, uniqueness and stability properties of the BGP equilibrium. The existence of an avoidance function that depends on z t impedes the analytical characterization of these properties. Furthermore, note that, unlike Barro (1990) , this is not an AK model. Both the existence of public capital and an endogenous rate of avoidance generate transitional dynamics. Hence, our economy exhibits transitional adjustment when there are initial imbalances in human and public capital. In the rest of the paper we will perform numerical simulations to characterize the growth and dynamics e¤ects of human capital accumulation, …scal policy and avoidance.
Calibration
We set the parameter values of our economy by mapping its BGP equilibrium onto some facts observed in the data of US economy. This de…nes the benchmark economy from which we numerically characterize the e¤ects of avoidance and …scal policy on long-run growth rate and welfare. In performing this calibration exercise we should note that we are considering that h t is a broad measure of capital that includes physical and human capital. Hence, in this exercise we have to take this fact into account when …tting the model with the data.
The calibration targets that we use are the following: (i) the private capital share is taken from Mankiw et al. (1992) ; (ii) a private investment-capital ratio equal to 0:076; (iii) a stationary growth rate of 2%; (iv) an after-tax net marginal return on human capital equal to 5:6%; (v) a public capital to GDP ratio of 2; (vi) a public investment to GDP ratio equal to 0:05; (vii) a intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 2; and (viii) an avoidance rate of 6%. There are not disposable estimations on the length of avoidance. However, as a benchmark value we take this rate of avoidance, which seems to correspond with a conservative approximation of the actual value according to the literature. We summarize the parameters of our benchmark economy in Table 1 . Note that the benchmark tax rate in this model is equal to 5:26%; which corresponds to an e¤ective rate of 5%: However, in our economy the only public expenditure is public investment, and the public budget is balanced.
[Insert Table 1 ]
Growth e¤ects
Taking the benchmark economy as a starting point, we have computed the stationary growth rate for di¤erent values of the nominal tax rate and the avoidance intensity a: Table 2 shows the results of these simulations. If we look at the table by rows, we …rst observe that the stationary growth rate decreases with the avoidance intensity a when the tax rate is su¢ ciently small. On the contrary, when the tax rate is su¢ ciently high, the relationship between the long-run growth rate and the avoidance intensity a displays inverted-U shape. In particular, our simulations show that the threshold value of that modi…es the pattern in the growth e¤ects of avoidance intensity is equal to 0:26:
[Insert Table 2] We summarize the growth e¤ects of avoidance in the following result: From this result, we conclude that tax avoidance can either stimulate or reduce longrun economic growth depending on the value of nominal tax rate and the intensity of tax avoidance a: The …rst panel of Figure 1 illustrates this conclusion by plotting the relationship between the stationary growth rate and the avoidance intensity a for two alternatives values of the nominal tax rates: (i) = 0:1 (continuous line); and (ii) = 0:4 (dashed line). The growth rate has a negative slope for all values of avoidance intensity a when = 0:1; whereas that rate reaches a maximum at some value of a in (0; 1) when = 0:4: Hence, avoidance may be positive for growth when the tax rate takes su¢ ciently high values. This conclusion leads us to compute the growth-maximizing value of avoidance rate for each value of the tax rate. The results of this exercise are given by the second panel of Figure 1 and by Table 3 . Observe that stationary growth is maximized in absence of avoidance (a = 0) if is smaller than = 0:26; whereas when > = 0:26 the growth-maximizing value of a is strictlypositive and increasing with . Table 3 computes the growth-maximizing value of a for alternative values of (second column), as well as the corresponding e¤ective tax-rate (third column), the stationary growth rate (forth column), and the deviation of these maximum growth rates from the benchmark value of 2% (…fth column). We observe that the growth rate is much larger (the double in average) under the growth-maximizing value of avoidance intensity a than it is under its benchmark value. Therefore, we can conclude that the growth e¤ects of avoidance are important and not trivial.
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 3] The intuition behind Result 1 is quite simple. The growth e¤ects of avoidance come from the distortion the e¤ective tax rate has on the accumulation of human capital. Remember that the marginal return from accumulating human capital has two components: (i) the e¤ective after-tax wage rate (R 1 ); and (ii) the increase in the avoidance and thus in the disposable income (R 2 ): We must characterize the e¤ects of an increase of the avoidance intensity on these two returns from investing in human capital.
(i) The increase in a reduces the e¤ective tax rate. This has two opposite sign e¤ects on the e¤ective after-tax wage rate (R 1 ): The …rst one is positive, since the disposable income goes up. The second one is negative, since this change stimulates capital accumulation, which will reduce the marginal productivity of human capital. This second e¤ect dominates when the e¤ective tax rate is low (small values of ):
(ii) The increase in a also a¤ects long-run growth by raising the avoidance gain from investment (R 2 ): The smaller the e¤ective tax rate is, the smaller is this e¤ect on the avoidance consequences from investing in human capital.
Another relevant result is derived from Table 2 . Looking at the columns we observe that when the avoidance intensity a is larger than 0:6, the growth rate always increases with . However, for avoidance intensity values between 0 and 0:6,the steady-state growth rate is a function with an inverted-U shape of the tax rate : That is, the stationary growth rate increases with until it reaches a maximum, and then that growth rate decreases for larger values. The next result summarizes the growth e¤ects of the tax rate :
Result 2. There is a threshold avoidance intensity value a, such that (a) When a > a, there exists a threshold value of tax rate, such that
Moreover, in anycase > 1 ; and
From this result we conclude that the threshold is the value of tax rate that maximizes long-run economic growth. More interestingly, this growth-maximizing tax rate increases in the intensity of avoidance a: Moreover, this tax rate is larger than the elasticity 1 of output y t with respect to public capital g t provided that avoidance is strictly positive (a > 0): Obviously, in absence of avoidance (a = 0) we obtain that = 1 as was established by Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993) . Figure 2 and Table 4 clearly illustrate these conclusions. The …rst panel of Figure 2 shows the dependence of growth rate on the tax rate for the benchmark value of avoidance intensity a: This dependence has a inverted-U shape, so that there is an interior value of that maximizes the stationary growth rate. The second panel of Figure 2 and Table  4 show the growth-maximizing tax rate as an increasing function of the avoidance intensity a: Furthermore, the growth rate is much larger (more than the double on average) under the growth-maximizing tax rate than it is under the benchmark tax rate. These results corroborate the importance of avoidance for the long-run growth rate.
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 4] The intuition behind Result 2 is easily obtained by checking the distortion on the decision of accumulating human capital. Consider an increase in the nominal tax rate . The two channels through which this policy change a¤ects long-run growth can be summarized as follows: Barro (1990) , the increase in the nominal tax rate has two opposite sign e¤ects on the e¤ective after-tax wage rate (R 1 ): First, the disposable income goes down because of the increase in the e¤ective tax rate. Second, this change discourages the accumulation of human capital, which will drive the marginal productivity of human capital up. This productivity e¤ect dominates when the nominal tax rate is low.
(ii) In addition, the increase in also a¤ects growth by raising the avoidance gain from accumulating human capital (R 2 ): This avoidance e¤ect of tax rate reinforces the positive productivity e¤ect of increasing . Therefore, this avoidance e¤ect increases the growth-maximizing tax rate above the elasticity 1 of output with respect to public capital.
Note that the existence of avoidance not only reduces the e¤ective tax rate until recovering the nominal tax rate without avoidance, but also introduces new mechanisms that a¤ect the economic growth rate. Table 4 clearly shows this result. Imagine a nominal tax rate increase from 0:33 to 0:38. In a economy without avoidance (a = 0) this policy has a negative impact on economic growth rate. However, in a economy where a = 0:1 this …scal policy will have a positive impact, although the corresponding e¤ective tax rate is 0:35, larger than 0:33:
Before closing this subsection, we study how the elasticity 1 of output with respect to public capital a¤ects the derived conclusions. It is clear that the contribution of public capital to production is a crucial piece of the mechanism that we have proposed to explain the relationship between avoidance, human capital accumulation and growth. We now perform some sensitivity analysis regarding this elasticity. Table 5 illustrates the dependence of the growth-maximizing value of avoidance intensity a with respect to 1 : Observe that the growth e¤ects of avoidance are qualitatively robust to the value of 1
: Given a value of , the growth-maximizing value of a increases when 1 goes to the extreme values in its domain (0; 1) : On the contrary, Table 6 shows how the growth-maximizing tax rate depends on the elasticity of output with respect to public capital. The growth e¤ects of nominal tax rate are also qualitatively robust to the value of 1
: Given a value of avoidance intensity a; the growth-maximizing value of generally decreases in 1 :
[Insert Tables 5 and 6] 
Welfare e¤ects
In this subsection we characterize the dynamic adjustment of our economy to imbalances between human and public capital, and how this adjustment depends on the intensity of avoidance a. In particular, we study the dynamic response of the economy to a negative shock on the stock of human capital h t and to a variation on the nominal tax rate : The procedure for our analysis is the following. We assume that the economy is initially in the benchmark BGP and, unexpectedly, one of the proposed perturbations is introduced on a permanent basis. We characterize the dynamic adjustment to the new BGP by computing the associated equilibrium paths of the aggregate variables.
To illustrate the e¤ects of avoidance intensity on the dynamic response we compute the welfare cost of the aforementioned exogenous shocks. As in Lucas (1987) , we measure the welfare cost by the percentage increase in consumption that the household should receive as a compensation for the shock. To illustrate this procedure, we denote the policy function relating the equilibrium value of consumption c t with the capital ratio z t by c t = c (z t ; t ) ; where t = fA; ; ; ; ; ; ; a; z t g is the vector of fundamentals. Consider that the vector of fundamentals changes from 0 ; corresponding to the benchmark economy, to 1 : The welfare cost of this change is the constant fraction of consumption that one should give to the household every period after the shock to obtain the same utility as in the situation where the economy permanently stays at the benchmark BGP. Thus, the fraction is the that solves the following equation:
where z denotes the stationary value of capital ratio z t along the benchmark BGP. If is positive (negative), then the shock generates a welfare cost (gain) because this means that the household should receive (give) consumption as a compensation for the shock. We are interested in numerically studying how our measure of welfare cost depends on the avoidance intensity a: In order to make the welfare costs comparable across the alternatives values of a; we will adjust the TFP parameter A when we change a. This ensures that all of the simulated economies converge to the same stationary growth rate regarding their di¤erent avoidance intensity. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the welfare costs of reducing the stock of human capital h 0 by 15% in two di¤erent scenarios. Figure 3 computes this welfare cost when the tax rate takes its benchmark value, = 0:0526; whereas Figure 4 computes this cost for a larger nominal tax value, = 0:4: The main conclusion is that the e¤ects of avoidance on this welfare cost depends on the nominal tax rate : When is at the benchmark level, the welfare cost decreases in the intensity of avoidance a: Note that this e¤ect has an opposite sign on the growth e¤ects of avoidance. However, the magnitude of the e¤ects of a on the welfare cost in this case is very small. To better illustrate this point, the second panel of Figure 3 shows the logarithmic deviation of the welfare cost under each value of a with respect to the welfare cost in absence of avoidance (a = 0): This …gure shows that the maximum reduction is of 12% for very high values of a: Figure 4 shows that when = 0:4; the relationship between the welfare cost of the negative shock in h 0 and the intensity of avoidance a is not monotonic. The welfare cost increases (decreases) in a for su¢ ciently small (large) values of this parameter. In this case, there exists an interior value of a such that, the welfare cost of the negative shock in human capital reaches its maximum value. In any case, the welfare cost is again of a quite small magnitude. The second panel of Figure 4 shows these magnitudes.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4] Let us now study the dynamic response of the economy to a variation on the nominal tax rate : Figure 5 presents the welfare costs of reducing the nominal tax rate from its benchmark value to 0:04: The main conclusion is that this tax reduction generates a welfare cost. The intuition behind this result is simple. The policy change increases disposable income and stimulates the accumulation of human capital, which drives the marginal productivity of human capital down. Furthermore, the reduction in decreases the e¤ect of investing on the ability to avoid taxes (R 2 ). This reinforces the aforementioned e¤ect from the reduction in the marginal productivity of capital. The …rst panel of Figure 5 shows that this welfare cost increases in the intensity of avoidance a: Moreover, the second panel illustrates that the e¤ects of avoidance on the welfare cost of this policy reform is quite large. The logarithmic deviation of welfare cost from the welfare cost in absence of avoidance (a = 0) is between 0 and 50% depending on the value of the avoidance intensity a:
[Insert Figure 5] As was explained above, the welfare cost of reducing the tax rate from its benchmark value derives from the fact that this value is quite below the social optimal value. We have checked that if the initial value of the tax rate is su¢ ciently large, the results are just the opposite of those provided by Figure 5 . In this case, reducing the tax rate generates a welfare gain, whereas increasing the tax rate results in a welfare cost. In any case, the welfare e¤ects are always increasing in the intensity of avoidance a; and the e¤ects of this intensity in the welfare e¤ects are quantitatively important.
Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that the interaction between human capital accumulation and tax avoidance may have remarkable growth and welfare e¤ects. In our model, individuals can change their ability to avoid taxes by investing in human capital. Moreover, changes on avoidance intensity alter the human capital accumulation process. Taking this feedback into account, we have found that tax avoidance can either increase or reduce economic growth depending on the value of the nominal tax rate and on the avoidance intensity, i.e., the productivity of human capital in avoiding taxes. For instance, in economies with low nominal tax rates, human capital accumulation could a¤ect economic growth negatively if the taxpayers avoid taxes. We have also found that growth-maximizing tax rates crucially depend on the intensity of avoidance. Concerning welfare analysis, we have found that the impact of avoidance on the welfare produced by changes in the nominal tax rate is quite large. However the impact of the avoidance on the welfare produced by imbalances in human and public capital is small.
The analysis of the paper can extend in several directions. First, we can perform an optimal taxation analysis. In this type of endogenous growth model, private investment is socially suboptimal because it is a source of productive externalities. The private decision on consumption and investment determines the tax base and thus the stock of public capital and the marginal productivity of human capital. In the present model, the productive externalities also operate through avoidance technology. A second extension could be to study the e¤ects of avoidance on income inequality. Avoidance may be an important mechanism for inequality dynamics because it a¤ects tax progressivity. Furthermore, the rate of avoidance di¤ers across the di¤erent types of incomes. These two issues will de…ne our future research agenda. Table 2   Table 3 . Growth-maximizing avoidance 
